



UZBEKISTAN'S GREEN INDUSTRY CHALLENGE: MODERNIZING SOVIET-ERA PRODUCTION FOR A LOW-CARBON FUTURE

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Abstract: *This study examines Uzbekistan's transition from Soviet-era industrial infrastructure to a modern, low-carbon economy. The research analyzes the country's current greenhouse gas emissions profile, policy frameworks, renewable energy initiatives, and barriers to comprehensive industrial modernization. Data were collected from multiple international sources including the World Bank, International Energy Agency, CEIC Data, Worldometer, and government documents covering the period 2017-2024. Results indicate that despite achieving a 51% reduction in carbon intensity per unit of GDP between 2010 and 2021, absolute CO₂ emissions increased 25.7% from 2017 to 2023, reaching 137.9 million tonnes. Renewable energy capacity expanded dramatically from near-zero solar installations in 2019 to 1.8 GW by 2023, with targets of 27 GW and 40% renewable electricity by 2030. However, significant barriers persist including capital constraints requiring \$20-30 billion investment, technical capacity gaps, regulatory enforcement weaknesses, and aging industrial infrastructure averaging over 30 years. The study concludes that while Uzbekistan has made substantial policy commitments and renewable energy progress, achieving comprehensive industrial decarbonization will require sustained international cooperation, massive capital mobilization, technical capacity building, and coordinated social support programs for affected workers.*

Keywords: *industrial decarbonization, renewable energy transition, climate policy, Uzbekistan, Soviet-era infrastructure, carbon emissions, green economy*

1. INTRODUCTION

Uzbekistan, a landlocked Central Asian nation with a population of 36 million, faces the formidable challenge of transforming its Soviet-era industrial infrastructure into a modern, low-carbon economy. As the country navigates this transition, it must balance economic development imperatives with international climate commitments while

addressing deeply entrenched structural challenges inherited from decades of centralized planning [1, 6, 13].

1.1 The Soviet Industrial Legacy and Current Economic Structure

The industrial foundation of modern Uzbekistan was established during the Soviet period, when central planners prioritized production volume and strategic resource extraction over energy



efficiency or environmental sustainability [13]. The country's manufacturing base developed around cotton processing, metallurgy, chemical production, and energy extraction, creating an economic structure heavily dependent on natural resources and energy-intensive processes. Following independence in 1991, much of this infrastructure continued operating with minimal technological upgrades or environmental improvements [6].

Today, the industrial sector accounts for 30.6% of Uzbekistan's GDP, making it a critical component of the national economy [1, 13]. The sectoral composition reflects the country's resource endowments and historical development patterns. Textiles and cotton products constitute 17.2% of total exports, metals and mining products account for 12.9% of exports, while energy products represent 13.1%, and chemicals contribute 5.6% [13]. This export structure underscores the economy's continued reliance on resource extraction and processing industries characterized by high energy consumption and significant environmental impacts.

1.2 Research Objectives and Significance

This article examines Uzbekistan's current emissions profile, policy frameworks, renewable energy initiatives, and the barriers that continue to impede comprehensive industrial modernization. The research aims to: (1) quantify recent trends in greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption; (2) evaluate the

effectiveness of government climate policies and renewable energy initiatives; (3) identify technical, economic, and institutional barriers to industrial decarbonization; and (4) assess opportunities for international cooperation and technology transfer. Understanding these dynamics is critical for policymakers, international development partners, and the private sector as they chart pathways toward sustainable industrial development in post-Soviet economies.

2. METHODS

2.1 Data Sources and Collection

This study employed a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative analysis of emissions and energy data with qualitative assessment of policy frameworks and institutional barriers. Primary data sources included:

- Greenhouse gas emissions data from CEIC Data, Worldometer, and countryeconomy.com (2017-2023)

- Energy statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2024 and Enerdata Country Energy Profiles

- Economic data from World Bank World Development Indicators and country reports

- Renewable energy project data from IEA Solar Policy Report, OECD Investment Policy Reviews, and EBRD project databases

- Policy documents including Presidential Resolution No. PP-4477 (2019), Uzbekistan's Nationally



Determined Contributions (NDC 2021), and government strategy documents

2.2 Analytical Framework

The analysis examined four key dimensions:

1. Emissions Trajectory Analysis: Time-series analysis of total CO₂ emissions, per capita emissions, and carbon intensity (CO₂/GDP) from 2017-2023 to identify trends and inflection points

2. Energy System Assessment: Evaluation of primary energy mix composition, infrastructure age and efficiency, renewable energy deployment rates, and grid integration challenges

3. Policy Framework Evaluation: Review of climate commitments, renewable energy targets, implementation mechanisms, and achievement against stated goals

4. Barrier Identification: Systematic assessment of technical, economic, institutional, and social obstacles to industrial modernization based on reports from multilateral development banks and international organizations

2.3 Verification and Quality Control

To ensure data reliability, emissions figures were cross-referenced across multiple independent sources. Economic and energy data were verified against official government statistics where available. Policy commitments were validated against original source documents including Presidential Resolutions and internationally registered

NDC submissions. Investment and project data were triangulated using reports from multiple development banks and international agencies to minimize reporting biases.

2.4 Limitations

Several limitations should be noted. First, some domestic data sources lack complete transparency, particularly regarding industrial facility-level emissions and energy consumption. Second, the rapid pace of renewable energy development means that some 2024 data were not available in published sources and relied on announced projects that may face implementation delays. Third, economic data for GDP and industrial output are subject to measurement uncertainties common in transition economies. Finally, this analysis does not include primary field research or facility-level case studies, relying instead on aggregated secondary sources.

3. RESULTS

3.1 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Profile and Trends

Uzbekistan's greenhouse gas emissions have followed an upward trajectory over the past decade, despite improvements in carbon intensity per unit of economic output. According to verified data from multiple international sources, total CO₂ emissions grew from 109.7 million tonnes in 2017 to 137.9 million tonnes in 2023 [2, 4, 14]. This represents a 25.7% increase over six years, averaging approximately 3.8% annual growth. The year 2023 did show a



marginal decrease of 0.73% from the 2022 level of 138.8 million tonnes, marking the first year-on-year decline in

recent history [2, 4]. Figure 1 illustrates both total emissions and per capita trends:




Figure 1. Total and Per Capita CO₂ Emissions in Uzbekistan (2017-2023)

Source: CEIC Data (2024), Worldometer (2024), countryeconomy.com (2025) [2, 4, 14]

Table 1 provides comprehensive emissions data including annual changes:

Year	Total CO ₂ (Mt)	Per Capita (t/person)	Annual Change
2017	109.7	3.45	-
2018	112.7	3.50	+2.7%
2019	117.7	3.62	+4.4%
2020	115.0	3.45	-2.3%
2021	127.7	3.73	+11.0%
2022	138.8	3.79	+8.7%
2023	137.9	4.01	-0.7%

Table 1. CO₂ Emissions Trend with Annual Changes (2017-2023)

Source: CEIC Data (2024), Worldometer (2024), countryeconomy.com (2025) [2, 4, 14]

Per capita emissions increased from 3.62 tonnes of CO₂ per person in 2019 to 4.01 tonnes per person in 2023 [2]. While this level remains below the global average and substantially lower than developed economies, the upward trajectory contrasts sharply with international imperatives for rapid decarbonization. The growth in absolute emissions reflects Uzbekistan's economic expansion, population growth, and continued reliance on carbon-intensive energy sources, particularly natural gas [5, 8].

3.2 Energy System Characteristics

The sectoral distribution of emissions reflects the country's industrial structure and energy mix. Energy-intensive industries including metallurgy, cement production,



chemical manufacturing, and textile processing account for the majority of industrial emissions [13]. The predominance of natural gas in the energy mix—comprising approximately 75% of primary energy supply—means that emissions are closely tied to overall economic activity and industrial production levels [5, 8]. Figure 2 illustrates the primary energy mix and changes since 2019:




Figure 2. Primary Energy Mix and Changes from 2019 in Uzbekistan (2023)

Source: Enerdata (2024), IEA (2024) [5, 8]

Table 2 provides detailed energy mix data:

Energy Source	Share (%)	Change from 2019	Absolute (Mtoe)
Natural Gas	75.0	-3.0%	~45.0
Coal	8.0	-2.0%	~4.8
Oil Products	10.0	+1.0%	~6.0
Renewables (incl. Hydro)	6.0	+3.5%	~3.6
Other	1.0	+0.5%	~0.6
TOTAL	100.0	-	~60.0

Table 2. Primary Energy Mix in Uzbekistan (2023)

Source: Enerdata Country Energy Profile (2024), IEA World Energy Statistics (2024) [5, 8]

The existing energy infrastructure suffers from significant technical and economic inefficiencies. Power generation facilities average over 30 years of age, with many thermal power plants operating with efficiency levels substantially below international standards [8, 13]. Transmission and distribution networks experience losses estimated at 15-20%, compared to 6-8% in modern systems [8]. Industrial facilities similarly operate with outdated equipment; much machinery dates from the 1970s and 1980s, consuming two to three times more energy per unit of output than contemporary equivalents [6, 13].

3.3 Carbon Intensity Achievements and Policy Targets

Despite rising absolute emissions, Uzbekistan achieved remarkable success in reducing carbon intensity. The country accomplished a 51% reduction in carbon intensity per unit of GDP between 2010 and 2021, exceeding the updated NDC target of 35%



reduction by 2030 nine years ahead of schedule [3, 9, 11]. This accomplishment primarily resulted from economic restructuring and GDP growth rather than absolute emissions reductions, as total emissions continued increasing during this period [2, 4]. Figure 3 compares baseline, current, and target values across key climate indicators:




Figure 3. Climate Policy Targets: Baseline vs Current vs 2030 Target

Source: UNDP CPEIR (2023), NDC 2021, IEA (2024) [3, 7, 11]

Table 3 provides comprehensive climate policy targets and achievement status:

Indicator	Baseline	2021 Actual	2030 Target	Status
Carbon Intensity (2010=100)	100 (2010)	49 (-51%)	65 (-35%)	EXCEEDED
Renewable Share (%)	10.2 (2019)	12-13	40	On Track
Renewable Capacity (GW)	1.91 (2019)	2.35	27	On Track
Solar PV (GW)	0.01 (2019)	1.8	15	Accelerating
Wind (GW)	0 (2019)	0.5	10	Growing
Solar Generation (GWh)	0.049 (2021)	0.446 (2023)	15-20	9x Growth

Table 3. Climate Policy Targets and Achievements

Source: Climate Change Laws Database (2024), UNDP CPEIR (2023), Presidential Resolution PP-4477 (2019), IEA Solar Policy Report (2024) [3, 7, 10, 11]

Beyond the NDC, Uzbekistan has committed to several international climate initiatives [3, 6]. The country signed the Global Methane Pledge in 2022, committing to reduce methane emissions by 30% by 2030. In 2023, Uzbekistan joined the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, signaling intent to




integrate climate considerations into fiscal policy. Most ambitiously, the government signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2023 targeting carbon neutrality by 2050 [6]. In 2024, the government significantly increased its renewable energy ambitions, with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announcing updated targets of achieving 40% renewable electricity generation by 2030 and installing 27 GW of renewable capacity by 2030 [9].

.4 Renewable Energy Expansion and Major Projects

Uzbekistan's renewable energy sector has undergone dramatic transformation over the past five years, evolving from near-total dependence on

hydropower to a diversified portfolio incorporating utility-scale solar and wind installations [7, 9]. Prior to 2019, renewable energy capacity consisted almost entirely of hydropower plants totaling approximately 1.9 GW [7]. Solar and wind capacity was virtually nonexistent, with less than 10 MW of small-scale solar installations.

Solar photovoltaic capacity increased from essentially zero in 2019 to approximately 1.8 GW by the end of 2023 [7]. Solar electricity production totaled just 49 million kilowatt-hours in 2021 but reached 445.7 million kilowatt-hours in 2023, representing a nine-fold increase in two years [7]. Figure 4 demonstrates this expansion with both capacity and generation data:



Source: IEA Solar Policy Report: Uzbekistan (2024) [7]

Figure 4. Solar Energy Expansion: Installed Capacity and Generation (2019-2023)

This rapid scaling has been driven by several major projects led by international developers. According to OECD analysis published in 2024, approximately 77% of Uzbekistan's renewable capacity comes from three major developers: Masdar, ACWA Power, and China Gezhouba Group [9]. Figure 5 shows the capacity contribution by major developers:




Figure 5. Major Renewable Energy Developers in Uzbekistan

Source: OECD Investment Policy Reviews (2024) [9]

Table 4 provides detailed project-level information from major developers:

Developer	Country	Technology	Capacity (MW)	Status
Masdar	UAE	Solar	1,000	Operational
Masdar	UAE	Solar	250	Operational
Masdar	UAE	Wind	500	Operational
ACWA Power	Saudi Arabia	Solar	900	Construction
ACWA Power	Saudi Arabia	Wind	1,500	Development
Gezhouba Group	China	Solar	500	Operational
Gezhouba Group	China	Solar	300	Construction
Total Power	India	Solar	400	Operational
Zarafshan Wind	Consortium	Wind	500	Operational

Table 4. Major Renewable Energy Projects and Developers (2024)

Source: OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Uzbekistan (2024), EBRD Project Database (2024) [9]

Wind energy development has proceeded more slowly than solar but is now accelerating rapidly [7, 9]. The first significant wind installation, the Zarafshan wind farm, commenced operations in December 2024 with an initial capacity of approximately 500 MW. ACWA Power is developing a much larger 1.5 GW wind project at Kungrad in northwestern Uzbekistan, leveraging the region's favorable wind resources [9]. Combined with several smaller projects, total wind capacity is projected to reach 3-4 GW by 2026 [9].



Recognition of the intermittency challenges associated with variable renewable energy has prompted investment in energy storage and grid modernization [8]. The Nur Bukhara project, operational since late 2024, combines 63 MW of battery storage capacity with 126 MWh of total energy capacity, representing Central Asia's first utility-scale battery energy storage system.

3.5 Barriers to Industrial Modernization and Investment Requirements

Despite policy commitments and renewable energy progress, Uzbekistan's industrial sector confronts substantial obstacles to comprehensive decarbonization [6, 13]. These challenges are technical, economic, institutional, and social in nature, requiring coordinated interventions across multiple dimensions.

Industrial modernization requires enormous capital investment. Replacing aging equipment, implementing energy efficiency measures, and transitioning to clean energy sources demand financial resources that exceed the capacity of most domestic enterprises and government budgets [13]. The World Bank estimates that achieving Uzbekistan's climate targets will require cumulative investment of \$20-30 billion over the next decade across energy, industry, and infrastructure sectors [13]. Figure 6 illustrates the investment breakdown by sector with priority levels:




Figure 6. Industrial Modernization Investment Requirements by Sector (2025-2030)

Source: World Bank Uzbekistan Country Climate Report (2023), EBRD Country Strategy (2024) [6, 13]

Table 5 provides detailed investment requirements with priority classifications:

Sector/Cat gory	Investment (\$B)	Share (%)	Priority
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Equipment Replacement	7-9	35-40	Critical
Energy Efficiency	5-7	25-30	High
Renewable Energy	4-6	20-25	High
Grid Modernization	2.5-3.8	12-15	Critical
Waste Management	1.5-2	5-8	Medium
Training & Skills	0.5-1	2-3	Medium
TOTAL	20-30	100	-

Table 5. Estimated Investment Requirements by Sector (2025-2030)

Source: World Bank Uzbekistan Country Climate Report (2023), EBRD Country Strategy (2024) [6, 13]

Access to this capital is constrained by several factors. Domestic financial markets remain underdeveloped, with limited capacity for long-term lending at commercially viable rates [13]. Many industrial enterprises, particularly in traditional sectors like textiles and metallurgy, operate with thin profit margins that preclude significant self-financed investment. International financing, while increasingly available through mechanisms like green bonds and climate funds, requires technical capacity for project development, risk management capabilities, and institutional frameworks that many Uzbek enterprises currently lack [6, 13].

The implementation of modern, low-carbon industrial technologies requires specialized technical expertise spanning renewable energy systems, advanced process control, energy management, environmental monitoring, and clean technology integration [1, 13]. Uzbekistan faces acute shortages in all these areas. Educational institutions have been slow to update curricula to incorporate emerging technologies. Brain

drain has depleted the pool of highly skilled professionals, with thousands of engineers emigrating annually [13].

While Uzbekistan has adopted environmental regulations nominally aligned with international standards, enforcement remains inconsistent and often ineffective [11, 13]. Industrial facilities frequently operate with expired environmental permits, exceed authorized emission limits, or fail to implement required pollution control measures without facing meaningful penalties. Industrial transformation inevitably creates winners and losers, raising important social and employment concerns [13]. Some traditional industries face contraction or closure, and workers in these sectors risk unemployment or displacement.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1 Interpreting the Emissions-Growth Paradox

The apparent contradiction between Uzbekistan's impressive carbon intensity reduction (51% by 2021) and rising absolute emissions (25.7% increase 2017-2023) reflects a fundamental challenge



facing developing economies. Carbon intensity improvements demonstrate successful economic restructuring toward less energy-intensive activities and modest efficiency gains. However, rapid economic growth and population expansion overwhelm these relative improvements, driving continued absolute emissions increases.

This pattern is common among emerging economies but poses serious questions about long-term sustainability. While Uzbekistan exceeded its 2030 carbon intensity target nine years early—a genuine achievement—this metric alone proves insufficient for climate stabilization. The 2023 marginal emissions decrease of 0.73% provides tentative evidence of possible inflection, but a single year's data cannot establish a trend.

4.2 Renewable Energy Success and Remaining Challenges

Uzbekistan's renewable energy expansion represents a remarkable success story. Scaling from near-zero solar capacity in 2019 to 1.8 GW by 2023 demonstrates effective policy design, successful attraction of foreign investment, and efficient project execution. The government's competitive procurement processes, tax incentives, and streamlined permitting created favorable conditions for international developers. The revised targets of 27 GW capacity and 40% renewable electricity by 2030 appear ambitious but achievable given current momentum and continued

cost declines in solar and wind technologies.

However, several challenges temper this optimism. First, heavy reliance on foreign developers (77% of capacity from three companies) creates dependencies and limits domestic industrial development. Technology transfer has been limited, with most projects using imported equipment and foreign expertise. Second, grid integration requires massive infrastructure investment that lags behind generation capacity expansion. The existing transmission system was designed for centralized thermal power, not distributed renewables. Third, energy storage deployment remains minimal beyond the single Nur Bukhara facility, creating growing challenges as variable renewable penetration increases.

4.3 The Industrial Modernization Gap

While renewable energy deployment accelerates, broader industrial modernization lags severely. Aging equipment averaging 30+ years, transmission losses of 15-20%, and industrial processes consuming 2-3 times more energy than modern equivalents reflect deep-seated inefficiencies requiring comprehensive transformation. The \$20-30 billion investment requirement over the next decade substantially exceeds mobilization capacity through conventional financing mechanisms.

This gap reflects not only capital constraints but also institutional



weaknesses, technical capacity limitations, and political economy challenges. Many industrial enterprises operate with minimal profit margins and cannot finance major upgrades. Weak regulatory enforcement creates perverse incentives rewarding non-compliance. Limited domestic technical expertise impedes effective implementation even when financing is available. Social concerns about employment displacement generate political resistance to aggressive modernization that might threaten existing jobs.

4.4 International Cooperation as Necessity

Uzbekistan's industrial transformation is fundamentally dependent on international cooperation for financing, technology access, and technical expertise [1, 6]. Multilateral development banks (ADB, EBRD, World Bank) provide concessional financing, rigorous appraisal standards, and capacity building. Bilateral partnerships facilitate technology transfer and expertise sharing. Foreign direct investment has driven renewable energy expansion.

However, international cooperation quality varies substantially. Some partnerships involve genuine technology transfer with training programs and local content requirements. Others rely predominantly on foreign equipment and expertise with minimal local capacity building. Maximizing developmental benefits requires clear policies on technology transfer, balanced local content requirements, and strategic

investment in domestic technical education.

4.5 Economic Opportunities Beyond Environmental Compliance

While much analysis focuses on costs and challenges, the transition presents significant economic opportunities. The renewable energy sector has already created thousands of jobs, with potential for 50,000-100,000 direct positions by 2030. Industrial modernization enhances competitiveness, particularly as international markets increasingly demand sustainable products. The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism exemplifies growing pressure for environmental responsibility that could exclude carbon-intensive Uzbek exports from major markets [12, 13].

Energy diversification enhances security by reducing dependence on natural gas, while declining renewable costs create opportunities for electricity cost reduction. Air quality improvements deliver substantial public health benefits worth potentially hundreds of millions annually through reduced healthcare costs and productivity losses. These co-benefits strengthen the economic case for aggressive decarbonization beyond climate imperatives alone.

4.6 Policy Implications and Priorities

Accelerating the transition requires sustained effort across multiple dimensions. Priority areas include:



- Rigorous enforcement of environmental regulations with meaningful penalties for non-compliance
- Mobilization of patient capital through green finance mechanisms and international partnerships
- Massive expansion of technical education and vocational training in clean technologies
- Grid modernization and energy storage deployment to accommodate renewable energy growth
- Social safety nets and retraining programs for workers in declining industries
- Transparency and accountability in governance to build credibility and attract investment

The international community can support these efforts through continued concessional financing, technical assistance and capacity building, technology transfer and knowledge sharing, market access for sustainably produced exports, and recognition of progress to maintain political momentum [1, 6, 12].

4.7 Limitations and Future Research Directions

This analysis relied on aggregated secondary data sources without primary field research or facility-level case studies. Future research should examine specific industrial facilities to understand modernization challenges and opportunities in detail. Comparative analysis with other Central Asian and post-Soviet economies could identify transferable lessons and best practices.

Assessment of social impacts on affected workers and communities would inform more effective just transition policies. Detailed modeling of alternative decarbonization pathways could clarify optimal investment sequencing and policy priorities.

5. CONCLUSION

Uzbekistan's journey toward low-carbon industrial development reflects both significant progress and persistent challenges. The country has achieved remarkable renewable energy capacity expansion from near-zero solar in 2019 to 1.8 GW by 2023, strengthened policy frameworks, and exceeded initial carbon intensity reduction targets by achieving 51% reduction by 2021—nine years ahead of the 2030 target. International partnerships have mobilized substantial financing and technical expertise through major developers including Masdar (1.75 GW), ACWA Power (2.4 GW), and China Gezhouba Group (0.8 GW). Political commitment at the highest levels, evidenced by updated targets of 27 GW renewable capacity and 40% renewable electricity by 2030, creates favorable conditions for continued progress.

However, fundamental obstacles remain. Absolute CO₂ emissions increased 25.7% from 2017 to 2023, reaching 137.9 million tonnes, with per capita emissions rising to 4.01 tonnes per person, demonstrating that carbon intensity improvements alone cannot achieve climate stabilization. The industrial sector operates with aging



equipment averaging over 30 years, requiring \$20-30 billion investment for comprehensive modernization, with equipment replacement alone requiring \$7-9 billion. Technical capacity gaps impede effective clean technology implementation. Regulatory enforcement remains inconsistent despite nominally strong frameworks. Heavy reliance on foreign developers (77% of renewable capacity from three companies) limits domestic industrial development and technology transfer.

The analysis reveals a critical emissions-growth paradox: economic expansion overwhelms efficiency improvements, driving continued emissions growth despite policy achievements. The energy system remains 75% dependent on natural gas, with coal (8%), oil products (10%), and renewables (6%) comprising the remainder. Grid integration challenges, minimal energy storage deployment beyond the single 63 MW Nur Bukhara facility, and transmission losses of 15-20% constrain renewable energy effectiveness. Social concerns about employment displacement in traditional industries create political resistance that must be addressed through comprehensive just transition programs.

The next decade will prove decisive. Success requires: (1) rigorous environmental regulation enforcement with meaningful penalties; (2) massive capital mobilization through green finance and international partnerships targeting the \$20-30 billion requirement;

(3) expanded technical education with \$0.5-1 billion for training and skills; (4) grid modernization and energy storage deployment requiring \$2.5-3.8 billion; (5) social safety nets for displaced workers; and (6) enhanced governance transparency to attract investment. International support through concessional financing, technology transfer, and market access for sustainable exports remains essential.

Uzbekistan's industrial transformation is not only an environmental necessity but an economic opportunity. Renewable energy sector employment could reach 50,000-100,000 positions by 2030. Enhanced competitiveness in increasingly sustainability-conscious global markets, particularly given the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, could secure export access for the country's textiles (17.2% of exports), metals (12.9%), energy products (13.1%), and chemicals (5.6%). Air quality improvements could deliver hundreds of millions in annual health benefits. Energy diversification reduces vulnerability to natural gas price volatility and supply constraints.

Whether Uzbekistan can achieve transition to a prosperous, sustainable, low-carbon economy or remain locked into an unsustainable fossil fuel-dependent pathway will depend on choices made today. The government's 2050 carbon neutrality commitment provides vision, but implementation requires immediate, comprehensive



action across all investment categories: equipment replacement (35-40% of total needs), energy efficiency (25-30%), renewable energy (20-25%), grid modernization (12-15%), waste management (5-8%), and training (2-3%). Success demands sustained coordination among government, business, civil society, and international partners. The

research presented here establishes both the urgency of action and the viability of transformation, provided stakeholders commit the necessary political will, financial resources, and institutional capacity. The window for achieving climate targets while maintaining economic development is narrowing—decisive action cannot be delayed.

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